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Fair Use as Free Speech Fundamental:  
How Copyright Law Creates a Conflict Between 
International Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights Treaties 
Jacob Zweig* 
Copyright law grants individuals monopoly over a particular kernel of expression, whereas the 
right to freedom of expression theoretically grants others the right to use that same kernel of 
expression. In this sense, the right to freedom of expression conflicts with copyright law. This 
Note argues that a flexible, open-norm copyright exception like the U.S. fair use doctrine 
provides a free speech safety valve that is essential in resolving the conflict and is thus a 
necessary component of the right to freedom of expression protected by treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Therefore, countries that lack such a flexible copyright exception may be in violation of 
those treaties. This is significant because broad, flexible copyright exceptions are rare outside 
the United States.  
 
On the other hand, as indicated by an analysis of a recent World Trade Organization panel 
adjudication regarding section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, flexible, fair use-like 
copyright exceptions may violate the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property. This Note argues that the requirements of these human rights and intellectual 
property treaties may be in conflict with regard to the copyright exception member nations 
must enact to comply with each. However, recent developments indicate momentum toward 
international acceptance of flexible, fair use-like copyright exceptions. Thus, this conflict 
between the treaties should be resolved in favor of freedom of expression and flexible 
copyright exceptions. 
 
 *  J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013. Many thanks to Professor 
Margreth Barrett for her invaluable guidance, and to the members of the Hastings Law Journal editorial staff 
for all their feedback and support. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between copyright law and the right to freedom of 
expression has been the subject of much recent scholarly interest.1 This 
relationship can be viewed as a conflict because copyright law grants an 
individual monopoly over a particular expression, whereas the right to freedom 
of expression, broadly speaking, grants everyone the right to express 
themselves however they see fit, including (assuming a hypothetical, unlimited 
freedom of expression) through use of expression that another individual 
controls via copyright monopoly. 
In American copyright law, the conflict between copyright and the right to 
freedom of expression is generally seen as resolved by certain internal 
safeguards which ensure that the copyright monopoly does not transgress free 
 
 1. See Eric Barendt, Copyright and Free Speech Theory, in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and 
International Analyses 11, 11 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005). 
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expression interests, including the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use 
doctrine.2 Nearly every other country, however, lacks a fair use copyright 
exception.3 Thus, the free expression protections afforded in those countries are 
incomplete. 
Those countries’ imperfect free expression protections are significant 
because freedom of expression has been adopted as an international value in 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”)4 and the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).5 Other 
treaties establish substantive international minimum standards for copyright law, 
including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (“Berne”)6 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (“TRIPS”).7 These intellectual property treaties expressly limit the 
scope of exceptions that member states may enact to the exclusive copyright 
monopoly.8 
This Note argues that some type of flexible, fair use-like copyright 
exception is an essential component of the international human right to freedom 
of expression, but that the scope of such copyright exceptions creates an inherent 
tension between the international human right to freedom of expression and 
international intellectual property regimes. If a flexible copyright exception is 
essential to a fully realized right to freedom of expression, nations that lack 
such an exception may be in violation of the human right to freedom of 
expression delineated in ICCPR and ECHR. However, because a flexible, fair 
use-like copyright exception may violate the limitations on allowable copyright 
exceptions imposed by TRIPS and Berne, nations that have flexible exceptions 
may be in violation of those treaties. A nation that is a member of both 
ICCPR/ECHR and TRIPS/Berne may be unable to simultaneously comply with 
the requirements of each treaty with regard to the copyright exception that each 
treaty compels it to enact. Thus, the requirements of ICCPR/ECHR may be in 
conflict with those of TRIPS/Berne. However, this conflict may eventually be 
resolved by the trend toward international harmonization of copyright law, and 
by the increasing receptiveness of other countries to the United States’ fair use 
doctrine. 
 
 2. See id. at 14–15. 
 3. Tyler G. Newby, Note, What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use 
Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1633, 1642 (1999). 
 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 5. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]. 
 7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, opened for 
signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 8. See Newby, supra note 3, at 1636. 
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Part I examines the conflict between copyright law and the right to 
freedom of expression. Part I.A lays out the basis for the conflict. Part I.B 
argues that a flexible copyright exception is essential to resolving that conflict 
and is therefore an essential component of the right to freedom of expression. 
Part I.C briefly evaluates the suitability of the U.S. fair use doctrine for free 
speech purposes and suggests some ways in which an ideal flexible copyright 
exception might differ. Part I.D then examines the statutory copyright 
exception regimes common in other countries and explains why they do not 
adequately resolve the conflict between copyright law and the right to freedom 
of expression. 
Part II addresses the potential incompatibility of a flexible copyright 
exception with the requirements of TRIPS/Berne and the tension this potential 
incompatibility creates between those treaties and the human right to freedom 
of expression provided in ICCPR/ECHR. Part II.A provides some background 
information regarding TRIPS/Berne and ICCPR/ECHR. Part II.B examines 
how the TRIPS/Berne provision limiting allowable copyright exceptions may 
prevent member nations from adopting a flexible, open-norm copyright 
exception. Next, Part II.C argues that because a flexible copyright exception is 
an essential component of the human right of freedom of expression delineated 
in ICCPR/ECHR, the requirements of these treaties may be in conflict with 
those of Berne/TRIPS. 
Finally, Part III examines potential resolutions to the conflict between the 
requirements of TRIPS/Berne and ICCPR/ECHR that are implicit in the trend 
toward the international harmonization of copyright law and the slow but 
growing acceptance of U.S.-style fair use concepts in other countries. 
I.  The Presence of a Flexible Copyright Exception Is Essential to 
Resolving the Conflict Between Copyright Law and the Right to Freedom 
of Expression 
A Conflict Exists Between Copyright Law and the Right to Freedom of 
Expression 
A copyright grants its owner an exclusive property right in an original 
expression of an idea.9 Freedom of expression, although it may be delineated in 
several different ways, is broadly defined in Article 19 of ICCPR (“Article 19”) 
as including the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media.”10 Article 10 of ECHR (“Article 10”) 
provides a similar definition.11 
 
 9. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Free Expression: Analyzing the Convergence of 
Conflicting Normative Frameworks, 4 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 45, 50 (2004). 
 10. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19. 
 11. ECHR, supra note 5, at art. 10 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
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In theory, copyright law protects only expression and provides no rights to 
the “information and ideas” that Article 19 and Article 10 discuss.12 At first 
glance, this would seem to resolve any potential conflict. However, the line 
separating idea and expression is not always clear. When idea and expression 
overlap, this “idea-expression distinction”13 may not always be enough to avoid 
the conflict between copyright law and the right to freedom of expression. 
Generally speaking, it is not difficult to see how a right that grants an 
individual exclusive control over a particular expression might conflict with 
another right that essentially grants all individuals the right to express 
themselves however they see fit. If copyright law grants one person a 
monopoly over a particular kernel of expression that a second person wants to 
use, that second person’s right to freedom of expression has arguably been 
violated. 
For example, consider a situation in which one musician holds the 
copyright to a composition and a second musician wishes to express herself by 
composing a new song based upon that composition. Under U.S. copyright 
law, the first musician has an exclusive right to prepare “derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work.”14 The first musician may therefore refuse to 
allow the second musician to proceed (unless, of course, she is willing to face 
liability for copyright infringement). Thus, the second musician’s freedom to 
express herself has been abridged.15 The same reasoning applies in a situation 
in which a person simply wishes to express herself through repetition of 
someone else’s work of authorship, rather than through preparation of a 
derivative work. “Her choice to express herself by repeating or distributing 
someone else’s initially authored words . . . does not lessen the fact that her 
freedom is at stake.”16 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that the right to freedom of 
expression provided in ICCPR and ECHR is not absolute, and may to some 
extent be balanced with competing interests. Article 19 provides that the right 
shall be “subject to certain restrictions,” as are necessary for “respect of the 
rights or reputations of others” or for “the protection of national security or of 
public order . . . , or of public health or morals.”17 Article 10 contains similar 
 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.”). 
 12. See Barendt, supra note 1, at 14. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (West 2013). 
 15. See Sunimal Mendis, Copyright, the Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information: Exploring 
a Potential Public Interest Exception to Copyright in Europe 32 (2011). Mendis notes that “the establishment 
of a regime of exclusive rights has the counter-effect of hindering creative effort on the part of subsequent 
authors by fettering their ability to build upon the creativity of existing copyrighted works.” Id. This “imposes 
limits upon the manner in which such subsequent authors may exercise their freedom of expression and the 
ability of the public to benefit from the process of creative innovation.” Id. 
 16. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891, 936 (2002). 
 17. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19. 
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limitations, including such restrictions as are “necessary in a democratic 
society.”18 Some built-in limitations are necessary, since an absolute freedom 
of expression would be unmanageable. 
For example, an absolute freedom of expression would arguably provide 
no allowance for copyright of any kind, nor for common law concepts such as 
defamation. It is true that restriction of an expression that has been 
“propertized” by a copyright may be necessary “for respect of the rights” of the 
copyright holder or to promote values that are “necessary in a democratic 
society.”19 For example, copyright law establishes “a marketable right to the 
use of one’s expression” and thereby encourages the dissemination of ideas, 
including those that provide for the enlightened political discourse crucial in a 
democratic society.20 However, the recognition that copyright law can 
encourage the dissemination of ideas provides little guidance to courts 
regarding whether, in a given case, to prioritize the rights of a copyright holder 
or the competing right to freedom of expression belonging to someone else 
who wishes to use that holder’s copyrighted expression. A flexible, fair use-
like copyright exception provides the tools necessary to balance these concerns 
equitably. 
B. A Flexible, Open-Norm, Fair Use-Like Copyright Exception Is an 
Essential Ingredient of the Human Right to Freedom of Expression 
The conflict between copyright law and freedom of expression cannot be 
adequately resolved without a flexible, open-norm, fair use-like copyright 
exception. An open-norm copyright exception is one that is not confined to uses 
in specifically enumerated, predefined circumstances.21 Instead, an open-norm 
copyright exception can be applied flexibly to any category of use on a case-by-
case basis, cutting “across copyright.”22 Closed-norm copyright exceptions, on 
the other hand, provide a catalogue of legislatively created exceptions that allow 
use only in particular, narrowly defined categories.23 An example of a 
hypothetical closed-norm copyright exception would be an exception for use of 
excerpts of copyrighted books in academic research. 
 
 18. ECHR, supra note 5, at art. 10; see id. (“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”). 
 19. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19. 
 20. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 21. Richard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend? The Creeping Indulgence of Fair Use in International 
Copyright Law, 17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 267, 273 (2009). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Martin Senftleben, Bridging the Differences Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions—The Emerging 
EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 521, 522 (2010). 
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Instead of depending on a legislature to define precisely what uses should 
be allowed, open-norm copyright exceptions leave “the task of identifying 
individual cases of exempted unauthorized use to the courts.”24 Thus, the chief 
advantage of an open-norm copyright exception is that it allows “courts to 
create new, additional forms of permitted unauthorized use” that legislatures 
may not have anticipated.25 The flexibility provided by the open-norm 
approach is necessary if copyright law is to be reconciled with the right to 
freedom of expression. 
America’s fair use doctrine is an example of a flexible, open-norm 
copyright exception.26 However, before describing how the fair use doctrine 
helps reconcile the copyright monopoly with the right to free speech in U.S. 
law, two caveats must be addressed. First, the international right to freedom of 
expression found in ICCPR and ECHR is not necessarily coextensive with the 
right to free speech protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.27 Thus, analysis of fair use and U.S. law may not perfectly 
translate to an assessment of the international right to freedom of expression. 
Despite the differences, it is instructive to look to the American experience 
when analyzing the importance of a flexible copyright exception as a 
component of freedom of expression. 
Second, in assessing the effectiveness of America’s flexible copyright 
exception as a free speech tool, it is important to note that the relationship 
between free speech and copyright law has not historically been viewed as one 
of conflict.28 One reason may be that, while the First Amendment prohibits 
government from abridging free speech, copyright holders seeking to enforce 
their copyrights (and thus to potentially encroach on another individual’s 
freedom of expression) are not government actors.29 Furthermore, courts have 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 529. 
 26. See id. at 522–23. 
 27. See U.S. Const. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). For example, the 
international right more clearly delineates which activities it protects (such as the “freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds”), ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19, whereas the First Amendment 
merely protects “freedom of speech,” U.S. Const. amend. I, leaving much room for interpretation. Similarly, 
the international right contains built-in restrictions (for example, “[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of 
others”), ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19, whereas limitations to the First Amendment right to free speech have 
been provided through case law. 
 28. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. Intell. 
Prop. L. 319, 320 (2003). 
 29. See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Norms and the Problem of Private Censorship, in Copyright and 
Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses, supra note 1, at 67, 71. However, private rights to sue 
in other contexts “have sometimes been recognized as sufficiently governmental action that the First 
Amendment applies to them.” Id. at 72; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, Locating Copyright] (“[C]ourts [have] 
subjected private causes of action under the laws of trademark, right of publicity, defamation, right of privacy, 
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rarely entertained explicit First Amendment limitations on copyright and have 
generally rejected defenses to copyright infringement that rely on First 
Amendment arguments.30 “[F]or example, a news magazine cannot rely on the 
First Amendment to publish, without authorization, copyright-protected 
material but must instead obey the Copyright Act like everyone else.”31 
The view that copyright law does not conflict with the right to free speech 
is grounded in the idea that copyright law is the “engine of free expression.”32 
Under this theory, through the promise of royalties and license fees, the grant 
of copyright incentivizes authors, musicians, and artists to create new works 
and hence promotes, rather than undermines, free speech.33 The “engine of free 
expression” theory, however, does little to address the conflict that occurs 
when one individual wishes to express herself using another’s copyrighted 
expression. U.S. copyright law attempts to reconcile more specific conflicts 
between free speech and copyright law via two principles: the idea-expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.34 
The idea-expression dichotomy refers to the fact that copyright only 
protects an author’s original “expression” and not the “ideas” or information 
the author’s work may contain.35 Thus, others are free to use those ideas in a 
subsequent work, so long as they are expressed in a different manner. Melville 
Nimmer, an influential writer on free speech as well as copyright law, asserted 
 
interference with business relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wiretapping, and, in some 
instances, property to First Amendment scrutiny . . . .”). For example, in a defamation suit, reporters may 
invoke the protection of the First Amendment if they print certain false statements as a result of reasonable 
error. Gordon, supra, at 72; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment: What 
Eldred Misses—and Portends, in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses, supra 
note 1, at 127, 130 [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment] (noting that these contexts 
include precedent in the areas of trademark, right of publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 30. Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 128. 
 31. Edward L. Carter, Harmonization of Copyright Law in Response to Technological Change: Lessons 
from Europe About Fair Use and Free Expression, 30 U. La Verne L. Rev. 312, 341 (2009) (citing Sarl Louis 
Feraud Int’l. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 
669–71 (1991) (stating, in a non-copyright-law case, that “[t]he press, like others interested in publishing, may 
not publish copyrighted material without obeying the copyright laws”). 
 32. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 33. Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech 251–52 (2d ed. 2005). Criticism of the “engine of free expression” 
view has increased, however, as “[o]ngoing copyright industry consolidation on the one hand, and the 
explosion of digital dissemination of expression not dependent on the copyright incentive on the other, have 
vitiated the argument that, whatever its free speech costs, copyright ultimately serves to underwrite our system 
of free expression.” Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 29, at 13. 
 34. See Barendt, supra note 1, at 14–15. The Supreme Court seems to have recognized the importance of 
these two principles in reconciling free speech concerns with copyright law, noting that “copyright law 
contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003). 
 35. See Barendt, supra note 1, at 14; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (West 2013) (“Copyright protection 
subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. . . . In no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method 
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
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that the presence of the idea-expression dichotomy was sufficient to meet free 
speech concerns.36 In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
the Supreme Court noted that the idea-expression dichotomy strikes “a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.”37 However, while the idea-expression dichotomy does 
substantially limit the potential for abridgment of the right to freedom of 
expression, it does not fully resolve the conflict. 
A second internal mechanism through which American copyright law 
accommodates free expression concerns is the fair use doctrine.38 The fair use 
doctrine is a broad, flexible exception to copyright owners’ exclusive rights.39 
Although it evolved as a judicially created doctrine, it is now codified in 
section 107 of the Copyright Act, added in 1976.40 The fair use doctrine has 
been described as a “safety valve” to ensure that the public has access to works 
while still providing authors with monopoly rights so as to encourage creative 
activity.41 
Fair use permits, under certain broadly defined circumstances, “what 
would otherwise be an infringing use of a work.”42 Significantly, a fair use 
defense can allow “the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a 
copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.”43 
Section 107 provides a nonexclusive list of types of use that might be “fair,” 
including use “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”44 
The list of types of use listed in § 107 only provides guidance to courts 
about what kind of uses might be fair uses, and so not every instance of an 
enumerated use will be found to be fair in a given case. However, the types of 
uses in the list are significant because they “indicate two rationales behind the 
fair use doctrine: (1) permitting use where the transaction costs of obtaining a 
license outweigh the actual value of the use; and (2) allowing use where the 
public benefit in the use outweighs the harm to the copyright owner’s 
interests.”45 
Justice Blackmun described the fair use doctrine as follows: 
 
 36. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech 
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1192 (1970). 
 37. 471 U.S. at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 203). 
 38. Barendt, supra note 1, at 15. 
 39. Newby, supra note 3, at 1637. 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 41. Newby, supra note 3, at 1637 (citing Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the 
Celestial Jukebox 20 (1994)). 
 42. Newby, supra note 3, at 1637. 
 43. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 45. Newby, supra note 3, at 1638. 
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The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by 
the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their 
monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that 
granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of 
others. The inquiry is necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of 
situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.46 
As Blackmun noted, the key to the fair use doctrine’s function lies in its 
flexibility. Rather than enumerating particular types of use that are 
categorically considered “fair,” the fair use defense employs an open-norm 
approach that is not dependent on narrowly defined contexts.47 Section 107 of 
the Copyright Act articulates several nonexclusive factors which are to be 
weighed in determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is a fair 
use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.48 
As these factors indicate, rather than allowing for exceptions to the copyright 
monopoly only in specific circumstances, the fair use doctrine allows courts 
wide latitude in determining whether a particular use falls within the exception. 
While the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to expressly hold that the 
fair use doctrine is constitutionally compelled, the Court has invoked fair use 
as one of copyright law’s “traditional First Amendment safeguards.”49 Thus, 
the Court appears to recognize the doctrine’s constitutional pedigree.50 The 
Court has also stated that “courts should interpret and define [the scope of 
copyright’s internal safeguards] in a manner that comports with First 
Amendment concerns.”51 
The fair use as First Amendment safeguard approach was exemplified in an 
Eleventh Circuit decision, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,52 in which the 
 
 46. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479–80 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 47. Peltz, supra note 21, at 273. 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 49. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003). 
 50. See Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 136–44. Judge Stanley F. Birch, 
author of the Suntrust Bank opinion, noted that “[s]everal scholars have viewed [Eldred] as a recognition by 
the Court of the ‘constitutionalization’ of fair use.” Hon. Stanley F. Birch Jr., Copyright Fair Use: A 
Constitutional Imperative, 54 Fed. L. 44, 44 n.6 (2007); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How 
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535, 548 (2004) (“[O]ne can 
read Eldred and other cases to hold that fair use is constitutionally required.”). 
 51. See Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 147. 
 52. 268 F.3d 1257 (2001). 
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court determined that because the defendant was likely to prevail in a fair use 
defense, the owner of the copyrighted novel Gone With the Wind was not entitled 
to a preliminary injunction preventing publication of an allegedly infringing 
parody entitled The Wind Done Gone.53 Emphasizing that copyright law must be 
construed to incorporate First Amendment values, the court stated that fair use 
has “constitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use for First 
Amendment purposes.”54 
Regardless of whether it is constitutionally required, the presence of a fair 
use-like, open-norm exception to the copyright monopoly, in addition to the 
idea-expression dichotomy, is critical in resolving the conflict between freedom 
of expression and copyright law. A flexible copyright exception is necessary 
because there are a number of broad, unpredictable situations in which the idea-
expression dichotomy does not sufficiently safeguard freedom of expression. 
The first situation in which the idea-expression dichotomy does not 
sufficiently safeguard freedom of expression is where idea and expression 
overlap. Nimmer provided some famous examples, acknowledging that the idea-
expression distinction does not work in every case.55 He noted that sometimes in 
news reporting there is no way to communicate the character of an event without 
reproduction of the original item, such as a film of President Kennedy’s 
assassination or a photograph of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.56 In such 
cases, it is “only the expression, not the idea alone, that [can] adequately serve 
the needs of an enlightened democratic dialogue.”57 The “idea” of the subject 
matter conveyed by the film and photograph has become entangled with the 
“expressive” visual and artistic aspects of each. 
The ineffectiveness of the idea-expression dichotomy in preserving 
freedom of expression in cases where idea and expression overlap may be 
referred to as a “merger” problem. Under the merger doctrine, if “there is only 
one or a limited number of ways to express an idea,” the idea and expression 
are said to “merge,” and no copyright protection is available.58 The merger 
doctrine tends to work well in cases involving “highly utilitarian or functional 
works.”59 But in other situations where idea and expression overlap, 
application of the merger doctrine requires a “value-based decision.”60 
In cases involving artistic forms of expression, for example, or in 
Nimmer’s example of news reporting, it may be less clear whether what is 
 
 53. See Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 148. 
 54. See id. (citing Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260 n.3). But see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 
273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding limitations on access under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
and noting that fair use “has never been held to be a guarantee of access”). 
 55. Barendt, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Nimmer, supra note 36, at 1198–99). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Nimmer, supra note 36, at 1198. 
 58. Margreth Barrett, Intellectual Property: Cases and Materials 450 (4th ed. 2011). 
 59. See id. at 450–51. 
 60. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 68. 
Zweig_19 (D. Barca).doc (Do Not Delete) 7/23/13 8:31 PM 
1585 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1550 
 
 
being communicated is an expression or idea. Merger may not apply, and 
therefore a flexible, fair use-style defense is a necessary free speech safety 
valve. Through a balancing of the fair use factors, courts have leeway to allow 
speech appropriating content that walks the line between idea and expression 
when it would benefit the public and not overly burden the copyright holder. 
The idea-expression dichotomy does not provide this advantage, nor would a 
list of specifically enumerated statutory copyright exceptions, because a 
legislature could not anticipate every situation where freedom of expression or 
other concerns would dictate limiting a copyright holder’s rights. 
The number of cases that will require a flexible copyright exception in 
order to accommodate free speech concerns is significant because the line 
between idea and expression is difficult to draw.61 It has been described as 
“notoriously malleable and indeterminate.”62 Judge Learned Hand famously 
noted that “the line between idea and expression, ‘wherever it is drawn, will 
seem arbitrary.’”63 U.S. courts have struggled with the distinction. For 
example, in CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market 
Reports, Inc., the Second Circuit reversed a district court finding that a book of 
used car valuations was “nothing more than a compilation of unprotected 
facts” and found instead that the valuations were copyrightable expression 
because they represented “predictions by the . . . editors of future prices” that 
were based on “professional judgment and expertise.”64 
In New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 
however, the Second Circuit drew the idea-expression line differently.65 In that 
case, the New York Mercantile Exchange brought an action attempting to 
enforce copyright in its valuations of settlement prices for commodity futures 
contracts.66 The court held that the Exchange could not enforce the copyrights 
because to do so “would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.”67 The 
dissenting opinion objected that there was no meaningful way to distinguish the 
valuations found to be protectable expression in Maclean.68 Although these cases 
did not involve the fair use defense, they demonstrate that copyright defendants 
may not be able to rely on the idea-expression dichotomy alone. The fact that 
there are multiple ways to approach the problem indicates that some cases will 
fall through the cracks. 
A second, closely related situation in which the idea-expression 
dichotomy fails to provide sufficient leeway for free speech concerns involves 
 
 61. See, e.g., Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 29, at 19. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
 64. 44 F.3d 61, 64–67 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 65. 497 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 120 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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forms of expression that necessarily include appropriation in order to be 
effective (for example, a parody, a book or film review, a musical “remix,” or 
the use of music in a film). In First Amendment jurisprudence, “it is axiomatic 
that speakers must sometimes use particular locution in order to make their 
point.”69 In that context, the Supreme Court stated that “we cannot indulge the 
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”70 
The notion that the use of particular words might be necessary for 
effective communication is important because the right to effectively 
communicate ideas is arguably a component of the right to freedom of 
expression. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the First 
Amendment protects a right to speak effectively in its decisions affirming the 
right of protesters to use an effective method or location for protest.71 Thus 
there are situations in which an individual’s right to express herself effectively 
depends on her being allowed to use a particular expression, even if that 
expression is copyrighted. 
Nimmer’s example is illustrative here as well. It would be hard to 
characterize a photograph of the My Lai massacre as a case in which idea and 
expression have truly merged. As Nimmer noted, “the public could have 
learned the facts even without recourse to the photographs.”72 However, 
a denial that in fact any deaths had occurred would have been devastatingly 
refuted by the photographs in a way that the verbal reports of the deaths 
simply could not do. Anyone who would have to pass on their “ideas,” i.e., 
the fact that dead bodies were seen sprawled on the ground, would be at least 
as suspect as those who originally reported the occurrence of the deaths. The 
photographs themselves—the “expression of the idea,”—made all the 
difference.73 
Thus a person may have a powerful free speech interest in communicating using 
a copyright holder’s protected expression because that expression may be the 
only effective way to communicate the idea, despite the absence of a merger in 
fact. The idea-expression dichotomy would not help, because it is the 
 
 69. Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 143. 
 70. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that a state may not, consistently with the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of a single four-letter expletive a criminal 
offense). 
 71. See Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for 
Meaningful Boundaries, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 973, 1013 nn.145 & 146 (2007) (“The First Amendment does 
accommodate the speaker’s need to reach his or her target audience.”); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 
U.S. 43, 56–59 (1994) (holding that a city’s ban on almost all residential signs violates the First Amendment 
and noting that “[d]isplaying a sign from one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct from 
placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means”); Heffron v. Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (“The First Amendment protects the right of 
every citizen to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their 
attention.’”). 
 72. Nimmer, supra note 36, at 1198. 
 73. Id. 
Zweig_19 (D. Barca).doc (Do Not Delete) 7/23/13 8:31 PM 
1585 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1550 
 
 
expression that the dichotomy places off-limits. A statutory copyright 
exception for news reporting might be helpful given these specific facts, but 
surely an artist who wishes to use the My Lai photograph in a creative work 
also has a legitimate claim to freedom of expression. A legislature could not 
reasonably anticipate every use in which freedom of expression values should 
take precedent over a copyright holder’s monopoly. However, a flexible, fair 
use-like doctrine allows courts to undertake a balancing of competing interests 
and allow such uses in appropriate cases. 
With regard to copyright law’s potential to abridge the effective 
communication of ideas, Neil Weinstock Netanel has described several other 
situations in which “effective speech sometimes require[d] the verbatim 
copying of substantial portions of existing literary expression.”74 For example, 
in “the late 1930’s, a college student . . . produce[d] a translation of substantial 
portions of Hitler’s Mein Kampf in order to counter the innocuous impression 
that the heavily edited official English translation had sought to convey.”75 In 
another case, a newspaper published “a racist fable from a Minneapolis police 
department newsletter in order to expose racism in the police department.”76 In 
yet another, a “church organization decide[d] to discontinue the distribution 
and use of a religious tract written by the [deceased] founder of the church 
because the tract no longer comport[ed] with evolving church doctrine.”77 “A 
dissident offshoot of the church, claiming to strictly follow the founder’s 
teachings, reproduce[d] and disseminate[d] the tract as required reading for all 
its members.”78 
Netanel indicates that: 
   In these cases, speakers copied a copyright holder’s literary work in order 
to expose the original author’s odious ideas or character, convey more 
precisely the author’s thoughts or thought patterns, or engage in religious 
practice. One cannot say that such copying was absolutely necessary for the 
speaker to make his or her point. After all, each speaker could have 
described the contents of the plaintiff’s work entirely in the speaker’s own 
words. But in each of these instances, the defendant’s speech would have 
been far less effective, far less believable, and of far less value to the 
intended audience, without reproducing (or translating) verbatim substantial 
portions of the author’s work.79 
 
 74. Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 29, at 15. 
 75. Id. (citing Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ’g Co., 28 F. Supp. 676, 677–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 
(granting motion for temporary injunction on the distribution of defendant’s edition)). 
 76. Id. (citing Belmore v. City Pages Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 680 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding unauthorized 
publication of a fable was fair use)). 
 77. Id. (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 
2000)). 
 78. Id. (citing Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113–20 (holding defendant’s use of work did not 
constitute fair use)). 
 79. Id. at 16. 
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Although the court did not find the fair use defense justified in all of these cases, 
the doctrine allowed the court to rationally balance competing interests in a 
manner that a specific, statutory copyright exception would not provide. It is 
difficult to imagine, for example, how a legislature could craft an effective 
statutory exception for alternative translations of material that suffers from a 
politically skewed official English translation (as in the case of Mein Kampf), 
despite the public interest in access to alternative translations. 
A third situation in which the idea-expression dichotomy does not 
adequately protect freedom of expression also involves forms of expression that 
necessarily include borrowing from other works. In some cases, creators of new 
works may simply be unable to locate the holder of the original copyright in 
order to obtain the copyright holder’s permission to use the work.80 Copyright 
law arguably functions in such cases as a complete abridgement of the second 
creator’s right to express herself in her chosen manner without risking liability 
for infringement. A flexible, fair use-like copyright exception would allow 
courts to decide that, in some cases, unauthorized use when the copyright 
holder could not be located would not infringe.81 
 
 80. This has been referred to as an “orphan work” issue, a “situation where the owner of a copyrighted 
work cannot be identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the work in a manner that 
requires permission of the copyright owner.” See Joel Sage, Note, Revenue Streams and Safe Harbors: How 
Water Law Suggests a Solution to Copyright’s Orphan Work Problem, 16 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 294, 294 
(2010) (citing U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works 1 (2006)). The “orphan work” phenomenon is not 
an insignificant problem. For example, the Copyright Office notes that a “submission by Carnegie Mellon 
University Libraries details that institution’s systematic study of the feasibility of obtaining permission to 
digitize and provide web-based access for its collection, during which it discovered that for the books in the 
study, 22% of the publishers could not be found.” U.S. Copyright Office, supra, at 22. In his dissent in Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, Justice Breyer pointed out that 
using [Congressional Research Service] estimates, one can estimate that, by 2018, the number of 
[still-in-copyright] works 75 years of age or older will be about 350,000. Because the Copyright 
Act of 1976 abolished the requirement that an owner must renew a copyright, such still-in-
copyright works (of little or no commercial value) will eventually number in the millions.  
  The potential users of such works include not only movie buffs and aging jazz fans, but also 
historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database operators, and researchers of all kinds—
those who want to make the past accessible for their own use or for that of others.  
537 U.S. 186, 249–50 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). However, the requirement that those 
who wish to use these works obtain permission from the copyright holder 
can inhibit or prevent the use of old works (particularly those without commercial value): 
(1) because it may prove expensive to track down or to contract with the copyright holder, 
(2) because the holder may prove impossible to find, or (3) because the holder when found may 
deny permission either outright or through misinformed efforts to bargain. The [Congressional 
Research Service], for example, has found that the cost of seeking permission “can be prohibitive.”  
Id. at 250. 
 81. Some commentators suggest that because the flexible, “case-by-case nature of the fair use doctrine 
carries with it . . . a degree of uncertainty that may deter users from using the work in question,” the fair use 
doctrine (though it may provide “some safety”) is not in itself sufficient to remedy the “orphan work” problem. 
Marc H. Greenberg, Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains, 7 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. 
Prop. L. 2, 36 (2007) (citing U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 80, at 55–56). However, the doctrine would 
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Even in cases where the copyright holder can be located but is unwilling 
to give permission (or if the second creator is unable to pay the copyright 
holder for permission), the second creator’s right to express herself in her 
chosen manner has been abridged. A flexible copyright exception would allow 
courts to decide that in some situations—for example where “the effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”82 is 
negligible—the second creator’s right to freedom of expression may trump the 
original copyright holder’s monopoly. Of course, a statutory copyright 
exception allowing use in some circumstances when the copyright holder is 
untraceable or unwilling could also potentially protect freedom of expression 
in this situation. However, a flexible exception would be better suited to do so, 
as it would allow an equitable balancing to take place regarding which 
particular situations the exception should apply to. 
Although protecting the rights of “appropriation artists” who wish to 
incorporate copyrighted expression into their works may sound like a relatively 
insignificant issue, due to recent technological changes, it can no longer be 
characterized as a minor concern. The rise of Internet distribution and digital 
content creation technologies has led to a cultural shift such that the creation of 
expressive works which baldly incorporate existing works has become part of 
the day-to-day lives of many people.83 For example, over one hour of video is 
uploaded to the video-sharing site YouTube every second.84 Many of these 
videos feature copyrighted songs or video footage in some capacity.85 Should 
the creation of a YouTube video featuring copyrighted material automatically 
classify every teenager as a copyright infringer simply for producing and 
sharing a video in which she sings a few lines of her favorite song? Although it 
is not clear the extent to which the fair use doctrine—as presently applied—
protects this type of arguably innocent use, it also seems inherent in the 
doctrine’s flexibility that it could protect such use.86 In this manner, a flexible, 
 
certainly allow for a second creator’s right to express herself in some such cases, and it would seem that for 
such a relatively narrow issue, only a limited amount of case law would be required to establish a fair use 
“baseline” allowing use of orphan works. 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2013). 
 83. See Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy 51–83 
(2008). 
 84. Statistics, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 85. See Lessig, supra note 83, at 2. 
 86. Although a fair use determination is necessarily fact specific, there are instances in which a court has 
found that an incidental use of copyrighted material in a YouTube video may constitute fair use. See Benjamin 
Wilson, Notice, Takedown, and the Good-Faith Standard: How to Protect Internet Users from Bad-Faith Removal 
of Web Content, 29 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 613, 616 (2010) (discussing Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. 
Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), in which “Internet user Stephanie Lenz challenged a takedown notification on the 
grounds of fair use, and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied defendant Universal 
Music Corporation’s motion to dismiss” after Lenz posted on YouTube a “home video of her child dancing . . . to 
the Prince song ‘Let’s Go Crazy’”). 
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fair use-like copyright exception can protect the creator’s freedom to express 
herself as she wishes. 
However, it must be acknowledged that there is a theory of fair use under 
which the doctrine may not protect an appropriator of copyrighted content. 
According to the market failure theory, the fair use doctrine applies “principally 
to the extent that it cures ‘market failures’ of one sort or another.”87 For example, 
the fair use doctrine would apply “only in cases in which transaction costs 
prevent licensing and in which not only the use in question, but also other similar 
uses by other persons, would create no adverse effect on the potential market for 
the copyrighted work.”88 
Courts have repeatedly invoked the “bare possibility” of licensing of a 
copyright holder’s work to deny fair use.89 Under the market failure approach, 
if it is even theoretically possible for our hypothetical teenager to obtain a 
license from the copyright holder of the song she wishes to use prior to 
creating her potentially infringing video, then she will not be able to avail 
herself of a fair use defense. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has noted that the “market for 
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works 
would in general develop or license others to develop.”90 Thus, one factor 
“deemed to make parody eligible for treatment as a fair use is that copyright 
holders do not ordinarily license artistic criticisms of their own works.”91 In the 
context of a home user’s production of a video meant to be shared on YouTube, 
Lawrence Lessig suggests that there “is no market in licensing music to amateur 
video.”92 Thus, there may be some room for fair use flexibility, even under the 
market failure theory. Still, the market failure theory somewhat undercuts the fair 
use doctrine’s ability to protect free expression interests. 
Furthermore, the fair use doctrine has been criticized as uncertain in its 
application and unpredictable, due to its inherent flexibility.93 Some 
commentators suggest that the doctrine may actually have a chilling effect on 
free speech because creators, faced with the prospect of a judicially applied 
 
 87. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1525, 1565 
(2004). 
 88. Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 29, at 21. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (holding that the commercial 
character of a song parody did not create a presumption against fair use and remanding for consideration of the 
parody’s effect on a market for a rap version of the original song). 
 91. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 92. See Lessig, supra note 83, at 3. 
 93. See, e.g., Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 143. But see P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities 7 (Univ. of Amsterdam, 
Working Paper No. 2012–39, 2011) (“[E]mpirical research into fair use case law suggests that the fair use rule 
as it is applied by the lower federal courts actually provides considerably more legal security than is sometimes 
assumed . . . .” (citing Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549 (2008))). 
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balancing test, will not know in advance whether they will be protected and may 
therefore curtail their speech.94 
However, reconciling the conflict between freedom of expression and 
copyright law requires balancing the speakers’ liberty interests against the 
copyright holders’ property interests. Thus, a flexible copyright exception that 
is firmly grounded in balancing principles is well suited to the task. While 
U.S.-style fair use goes a long way toward accommodating free expression 
concerns, it may not be the ideal doctrine for this purpose. 
C.  What an Ideal Flexible Copyright Exception Might Include to Better 
Incorporate Free Expression Values 
Having established that a flexible, open-norm, fair use-like copyright 
exception is an essential component of the right to freedom of expression—and 
having acknowledged some of the shortcoming with the fair use doctrine itself—
it is useful to briefly analyze what an ideal flexible copyright exception for free 
speech purposes might look like. The fair use doctrine could be altered in several 
discrete ways in order to better accommodate the right to freedom of expression. 
As suggested by the market failure theory, fair use’s fourth factor, “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work,”95 holds perhaps the greatest potential to interfere with application of the 
doctrine for free expression purposes. The fourth factor might wholly abridge 
the free speech rights of individuals who wish to use copyrighted expression in 
a manner that could reduce the market value for the original work. 
The category of potentially market-harming uses represents a potentially 
large amount of uses because it could include any use for which a license 
might be obtained. The first factor, “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes,”96 presents similar issues. It allows courts to make 
value-based judgments regarding which uses are worthy, potentially abridging 
the free speech rights of many parties who wish to use copyrighted expression 
simply because it is, for example, of a commercial nature. 
The potential these factors have to permit courts to disallow whole 
categories of use could be ameliorated by incorporating a “public interest” 
balancing factor into an ideal flexible copyright exception. This would permit 
courts to weigh allowing uses—even commercial uses—that interfere with the 
market value for the original work in situations where there is a “public interest 
in access to the defendants’ expression.”97 A “public interest” factor would also 
 
 94. See Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment, supra note 29, at 143 (“[T]he notoriously 
unpredictable nature of the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use privilege induce considerable speaker self-
censorship.”). 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2013). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2567 (2009). 
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help courts apply the first fair use factor in a manner that could potentially 
abridge the free speech rights of fewer defendants, particularly in commercial 
use situations. 
Of course, the relevant “public interest” would need to be defined. There 
is arguably a public interest in, for example, access to works at a lower cost, 
but such a consideration would too directly undermine the general purpose of 
copyright law, which is to encourage the production of creative works.98 
Instead, the relevant public interest should favor provision of copyrighted 
works where there is no other reasonable means of access. In situations where 
there is no other reasonable means of access, the purpose of copyright law is 
not furthered by strict enforcement of the copyright monopoly (after all, 
creative works provide no public benefit if no one but their creator has access 
to them).99 Also, the “public interest” factor should weigh especially heavily in 
situations that implicate significant free expression values, such as those that 
involve political speech or accurate news reporting.100 
An ideal copyright exception for free expression purposes should also 
incorporate a factor explicitly directing courts to consider whether obtaining a 
license would be reasonable under the circumstances, whether a license has been 
unreasonably withheld, and whether, where a license was sought, the licensor 
insisted on unreasonable terms.101 A reasonable licensing provision would more 
directly address the problem the market failure theory presents to the fair use 
doctrine’s suitability as a free expression safeguard. As noted, markets are 
unlikely to develop for licenses authorizing “critical commentary or unwelcome 
transformations,”102 or for which there is little economic incentive to provide 
licenses. A reasonable licensing provision would enable courts to consider the 
availability of reasonable licensing opportunities as a balancing factor, 
potentially allowing defendants’ free speech interests to trump copyright holders’ 
interests when no such opportunity exists. 
The remaining two fair use factors, “the nature of the copyrighted work”103 
and “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
 
 98. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“[Copyright law] is intended definitely to grant 
valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford greater 
encouragement to the production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.” (quoting 
Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
 99. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not 
based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the 
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for 
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 2d Sess., 7 (1909))). 
 100. See Samuelson, supra note 97, at 2567. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2013). 
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copyrighted work as a whole”104 do not present such evident problems for the 
doctrine’s application as a free speech safeguard because neither factor invites 
mechanistic application to abridge whole classes of speech (such as commercial 
or market-harming speech).105 However, there is still some concern that these 
factors could serve to interfere with free expression values due to the fair use 
doctrine’s unpredictable application. 
There are three viable options for addressing the potential chilling effect 
on speech that unpredictable application of a flexible copyright exception 
presents. First, the adoption of a comprehensive set of enumerated, statutory 
copyright exceptions alongside an open-norm, flexible exception would go a 
long way toward providing certainty for potential defendants in many cases, 
while still allowing a free expression “safety valve” for uses not covered by the 
enumerated exceptions. Such an arrangement would combine the “legal 
security” advantages of a closed-norm system of copyright exceptions with the 
“fairness” advantages of an open-norm system.106 
Second, in applying an ideal, flexible copyright exception for free 
expression purposes, courts should apply the existing fair use factors in a manner 
that more explicitly invokes free expression values. Doing so would serve to 
create a baseline of case law upon which those wishing to engage in speech 
utilizing copyrighted expression could depend to determine whether their use is 
likely to be deemed fair. For example, courts should “be on the lookout for 
assertions of copyright that are motivated by a desire to censor points of view 
with which the rights holder disagrees or to achieve noncopyright goals such as 
protecting the rights holder’s privacy or reputation.”107 Courts should also 
expressly consider when a ruling in favor of a copyright holder might have a 
chilling effect on speech and attempt to cabin decisions to avoid doing so.108 
Third, a departure from the way damages are assessed in U.S. copyright 
law could eliminate some of the chilling effect on speech caused by 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. As Justice Brennan notes in his Harper & Row dissent, most of the activities listed in § 107 as 
paradigmatic examples of fair use can be characterized as commercial in nature. See Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
Many uses § 107 lists as paradigmatic examples of fair use, including criticism, comment, and 
news reporting, are generally conducted for profit in this country, a fact of which Congress was 
obviously aware when it enacted § 107. To negate any argument favoring fair use based on news 
reporting or criticism because that reporting or criticism was published for profit is to render 
meaningless the congressional imprimatur placed on such uses. 
Id. Indeed, there are likely few uses that could not have at least some indirect commercial purpose. Thus, it is 
important to note that it is not the case that commerciality always bars a finding of fair use. However, it can 
make an important difference. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 
(1984) (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the 
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright . . . .”). 
 106. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 93, at 6. 
 107. Samuelson, supra note 97, at 2566. 
 108. See id. 
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unpredictable application of a flexible copyright exception. If a use is ultimately 
deemed infringing, in cases that do not evidence any kind of bad faith, “the 
defendants should only have to pay actual damages (e.g., a reasonable license 
fee), rather than being subject to a large award of statutory damages.”109 The 
absence of the possibility of a large statutory penalty would help address the 
problem presented by a potential fair use defendant curtailing her speech in 
order to avoid such a penalty. 
These suggestions are meant to illustrate how a flexible, open-norm 
copyright exception ideally tailored to further free expression values might 
differ from the current U.S. fair use doctrine. However, given the status of 
copyright exceptions in other countries, current U.S.-style fair use provides a 
useful vantage point from which to evaluate how the copyright laws of those 
countries could better accommodate the right to freedom of expression. 
D. The Copyright Laws of Most Other Countries Do Not Include a Flexible, 
Fair Use-Like Doctrine of Copyright Exceptions 
Nearly every country apart from the United States lacks a flexible, open-
norm copyright exception.110 While some other countries employ copyright 
exceptions that may consider factors similar to the fair use factors, such as the 
United Kingdom’s fair dealing defense, most feature a closed-norm model in 
which exceptions to the copyright monopoly are limited to a range of 
specifically enumerated, statutorily permitted uses, such as research or news 
reporting.111 
Argentina, for example, has “an extremely limited and rigid fair dealing 
exception in its copyright law,” which provides, in part, that: 
 
 109. See id. at 2568 (footnote omitted). Under the United States’ current statutory damages clause, a 
copyright owner may elect to recover an award of statutory damages rather than actual damages from an 
infringer, “in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c)(1). However, if the copyright owner can prove willful infringement, the court has discretion to 
increase the statutory damages award to up to $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2). If, on the other hand, the infringer can 
prove “that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright,” the court has discretion to reduce the statutory damages award to “not less than 
$200.” Id. The exception for non-willful infringement could be given a reasonable damages cap and perhaps 
made nondiscretionary. Furthermore, the statutory damages exception for uses reasonably thought to be fair 
uses could be expanded. Currently, the Copyright Act directs that 
[t]he court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had 
reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under 
section 107, if the infringer was . . . an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, 
library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment . . . or . . . a public 
broadcasting entity . . . . 
Id. This exception could be expanded to cover private, noncommercial uses reasonably thought to be fair uses 
by individuals outside of the institutional contexts currently protected by the exception (such as, potentially, 
the use of copyrighted music in a home video). 
 110. Newby, supra note 3, at 1642. Only Israel has adopted a broadly flexible, open-norm, U.S.-style 
statutory fair use doctrine. Peltz, supra note 21, at 285. 
 111. Peltz, supra note 21, at 274; see also Newby, supra note 3, at 1642–44. 
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[a]ny person may publish, for educational or scientific purposes, 
commentaries, criticisms, or notes relating to intellectual works and 
incorporate into such commentaries, criticisms or notes of not more than one 
thousand words from literary or scientific works, or not more than eight bars 
from musical works, and in any case only such parts of the text as are 
indispensable for the aforesaid purposes.112 
Note that Argentina’s exception is limited to “educational or scientific 
purposes” and puts precise quantitative limits on any copying that may be 
performed for those purposes.113 This is very different from the American fair 
use approach, in which “the nature of the use and the amount copied are 
nondispositive factors for courts to weigh.”114 
Another example is Germany, which provides limited exceptions to 
copyright owners’ rights that are somewhat similar to those recognized as fair 
use in America, but which are more specific and stringent.115 For example, the 
German code contains an exception for making single copies, “for personal 
scientific use, if and to the extent that such reproduction is necessary for the 
purpose.”116 Similarly, “Japan lacks a broad fair use doctrine, and limitations 
on copyright owners’ rights are restricted to the specific exceptions listed in 
Articles 30 through 49 of the Japanese Copyright Act.”117 
Closed-norm, statutorily enumerated copyright exceptions do not 
adequately resolve the conflict between freedom of expression and the 
copyright monopoly. Closed-norm copyright exceptions fail to adequately 
safeguard free expression interests where idea and expression overlap because 
a legislature cannot reasonably be expected to address every possible situation 
in which instances of freedom of expression may be improperly abridged. 
Moreover, “[w]hereas legislatures of the 19th and early 20th Century could 
still anticipate and adequately respond to the main technological changes that 
required modification of the law, the accelerating pace of technological change 
in the early 21st Century no longer allows such legislative foresight.”118 
Due to a lack of flexibility and the impossibility of comprehensive 
legislative foresight, enumerated copyright exceptions fail to provide sufficient 
free speech protection, particularly for forms of expression which necessarily 
involve appropriation.119 Furthermore, in many instances “the legislative cycle 
 
 112. Newby, supra note 3, at 1643 (quoting Law No. 11.723, art. 10, Sept. 28, 1933 (as amended, Oct. 18, 
1989), translated in Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, at Argentina: Item 1 (1997)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1644 (citing Adolf Dietz, Germany, in International Copyright Law and Practice § 8[2][a] (Paul 
Edward Geller ed., 1998)). 
 116. Id. (quoting Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Sept. 9, 1965 (as amended, June 9, 1993), 
translated in Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, supra note 112, at Germany: Item 1). 
 117. Id. (citing Law No. 48 of 1970, arts. 30–49 (as amended, June 28, 1989), translated in Copyright 
Laws and Treaties of the World, supra note 112, at Japan: Item 1). 
 118. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 93, at 7. 
 119. See id. at 10 (“Whereas social media have in recent times become an essential means of social and 
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in copyright has become ever longer” as copyright has become more “highly 
politicized.”120 Some scholars suggest that, in European Union countries at 
least, “the total legislative response time to a new technological development 
may well exceed ten years.”121 Thus it is increasingly unlikely that legislatures 
will be able to reliably create suitable statutory copyright exceptions in the face 
of ever-changing circumstances. Legislative gridlock combined with closed-
norm copyright exceptions places compliance with the freedom of expression 
provisions of treaties such as ICCPR and ECHR in serious jeopardy. 
II.  Conflicting International Treaties: The Potential Incompatibility of a 
Flexible Copyright Exception with the Berne/TRIPS Three-Step Test 
Delineating a flexible copyright exception as necessarily part of the 
human right to freedom of expression found in human rights treaties such as 
ICCPR and ECHR creates a tension between the requirements of those treaties 
and those of international intellectual property treaties such as Berne and 
TRIPS. Before discussing this tension, however, some background information 
regarding these treaties is necessary. 
A. Background 
In the area of human rights, 167 countries, including the United States, 
are members of ICCPR,122 which provides a broadly defined human right to 
freedom of expression.123 ECHR, to which all the members of the Council of 
Europe belong,124 also provides a similar, broadly defined human right to 
freedom of expression.125 
In the area of intellectual property, TRIPS, to which members of the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) belong, is an international regime created on April 
15, 1994 (effective January 1, 1996126) at the Uruguay Round of negotiations to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.127 TRIPS established not only 
minimum international standards for protection of intellectual property rights, 
 
cultural communication, current copyright law [like the inflexible regimes common in European countries] 
leaves little or no room for sharing ‘user-generated content’ that builds upon pre-existing works.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 120. See id. at 7. 
 121. See id. at 7–8 (citing Mireille Van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law: The 
Challenges of Better Lawmaking 298 (2009)). 
 122. See Status: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no= 
IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 123. See ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19. 
 124. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=18/03/2012& 
CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 125. See ECHR, supra note 5, at art. 10. 
 126. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 65(1). 
 127. Newby, supra note 3, at 1635. 
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but also, for the first time, an international enforcement mechanism for those 
standards.128 In particular, TRIPS allows members to bring disputes relating to 
enforcement of the standards of the agreement before the WTO for 
resolution.129 A WTO member state may request that a WTO panel adjudicate 
an allegation of non-compliance with TRIPS’s substantive provisions on the 
part of another member state.130 After the panel issues a decision, the WTO has 
authority to enforce trade sanctions against a member state that fails to 
comply.131 
Substantively, TRIPS incorporated several preexisting multilateral 
intellectual property treaties.132 In the area of copyright law, TRIPS 
incorporated the provisions of Berne.133 TRIPS and Berne establish 
international copyright norms that provide for some freedom of expression 
safeguards. For example, the idea-expression dichotomy is codified in 
Article 9(2) of TRIPS.134 TRIPS also expressly limits the scope of exceptions 
that member states may enact to the exclusive copyright monopoly.135 
Article 13 of TRIPS provides that “[m]embers shall confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder.”136 Article 13 is referred to as the three-
step test, adapted with somewhat more restrictive language from Article 9(2) 
of Berne.137 The three steps, as set forth in the language of Article 13, are 
“(1) special case, (2) supra-normal exploitation, and (3) lack of unreasonable 
prejudice.”138 Unfortunately, neither TRIPS nor Berne offer any guidance or 
commentary as to what is required by these three prongs.139 Although the 
requirements are unclear, it is still possible to analyze how the fair use doctrine 
might hold up if challenged under the three-step test. 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 
119, 121 (2002). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Newby, supra note 3, at 1635. 
 133. Id. 
 134. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 9(2) (“Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”). 
 135. Newby, supra note 3, at 1636. 
 136. TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 13. 
 137. Newby, supra note 3, at 1648. 
 138. Peltz, supra note 21, at 272–73. 
 139. Newby, supra note 3, at 1647–48. 
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B. The Berne/TRIPS Three-Step Test May Prevent Member Nations from 
Adopting a Flexible, Fair Use-Like Copyright Exception 
A flexible, fair use-like copyright exception might violate the three-step 
test and hence be inconsistent with TRIPS. Several commentators have in fact 
argued that the American fair use doctrine may not survive the three-step 
test.140 Generally speaking, the doctrine’s breadth and unpredictable 
application present the most significant problems for its compatibility with 
TRIPS.141  
Both the U.S. fair use doctrine and the [three-step] test are “open norms” in 
the sense that they cut across copyright and are not facially confined to 
dependence on use in a narrowly defined context; however, the [three-step] 
test, dependent as it is on “[certain] special cases,” was designed to 
accommodate the “closed norm” approach prevalent among the world’s 
national legal systems.142 
The three-step test’s reference in its first prong to “‘certain’ and ‘special 
cases’” has been construed to require “definite, fixed, non-variable limitations 
to copyright.”143 Under this interpretation, the first prong requires “national 
laws to contain sufficient specifications which identify the cases to be 
exempted” from copyright protection.144 Given that fair use applies 
unpredictably across the spectrum of copyrightable subject matter and potential 
uses rather than identifying specific cases to be exempted, under the “non-
variable” interpretation of “certain special cases” the fair use doctrine likely 
violates the first prong of the three-step test. 
However, it is also possible to construe “certain special cases” in a more 
literal manner that would seem to allow for a flexible, fair use-like copyright 
exception. Fair use determinations are made by courts on a case-by-case basis. 
Every time a U.S. court holds whether or not a specific use is fair, it is granting 
a copyright exception that is “specific as regards that particular case.”145 In this 
sense, the fair use doctrine, by definition, only applies in “certain special 
cases.”146 Along the same lines, if a nation with a comprehensive set of 
enumerated, statutory copyright exceptions adopted a general fair use defense, 
it would apply essentially as a supplementary doctrine to the statutory 
 
 140. See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 21, at 273; see also Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the 
Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law 113 (2004); 
Gerald Dworkin, Copyright, the Public Interest, and Freedom of Speech: A UK Copyright Lawyer’s 
Perspective, in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses, supra note 1, at 153, 
161–62; Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 75, 114–23. 
 141. See Okediji, supra note 140, at 117. 
 142. Peltz, supra note 21, at 273. 
 143. See Mendis, supra note 15, at 76. 
 144. See id. at 77. 
 145. See id. at 78. 
 146.  See id. at 77. 
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exceptions.147 Arguably, the supplementary doctrine would apply only to those 
“special cases” that fall outside the statutory exceptions.148 
It is also arguable that the fair use doctrine has an open-ended potential to 
reduce remuneration for copyright holders and thus may “unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder” in violation of the third 
prong of the three-step test.149 Indeed, some commentators suggest that “[t]he 
three-step test has come to stand for the idea that virtually no copyright 
exception can be allowed if it diminishes the compensation to authors or 
subsequent rights-holders.”150 
The fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work,”151 may help to reconcile the fair use 
doctrine with the third prong of the three-step test. The Supreme Court has 
called the fourth factor “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”152 The Court explained that “[f]air use, when properly applied, is limited 
to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of the 
work which is copied.”153 If this is the case, then application of the doctrine 
should not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.”154 
However, under the fourth fair use factor, only a use that supplants demand 
for the copyrighted work weighs against a finding of fair use.155 A use which 
suppresses demand (for example, through “biting criticism”) does not.156 In 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the holder of the copyright on Roy 
Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman” sued the members of rap music group 
2 Live Crew, alleging infringement over the rap group’s commercial parody of 
the song.157 The Supreme Court indicated that if a “parody, like a scathing 
theater review, kills demand for the original,” this would not weigh against a 
finding of fair use under the fourth factor.158 
Thus there are uses, such as parody, which may negatively impact the 
potential market for the copyrighted work and still be found to be fair use. That 
a use that impacts the market for the original work could be found a fair use 
 
 147. The United States does in fact have a set of statutory copyright exceptions in addition to the fair use 
doctrine, though it would not be entirely accurate to characterize them as comprehensive. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 107–22 (West 2013). 
 148. See Mendis, supra note 15, at 79. 
 149. See Carter, supra note 31, at 329.   
 150. Id. at 326 (citing Christophe Geiger et al., Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step 
Test” in Copyright Law, 30 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 489, 490–91 (2008)). 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 152. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 153. Id. at 566–67. 
 154.  See Carter, supra note 31, at 329.   
 155. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
 156. Id. at 591–92. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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demonstrates that the fourth fair use factor may not completely square the fair 
use doctrine with the third prong of the three-step test. On the other hand, the 
third step bars only unreasonable prejudice to the right holder’s legitimate 
interests.159 Arguably any prejudice caused by criticism or parody would not 
be unreasonable. 
Other WTO member countries have expressed concern that the American 
fair use doctrine may violate the three-step test. For example, the European 
Community questioned the United States regarding “how the fair use doctrine, 
as it has been broadly applied and interpreted by U.S. courts, particularly in 
connection with a ‘parody’ that diminishes the value of a work, is consistent 
with TRIPS Article 13.”160 Australia has also asked questions about the 
consistency of American fair use doctrine with the three-step test.161 In 
response, the U.S. government argued that the fair use doctrine “embodies 
essentially the same goals as Article 13 of TRIPS, and is applied and 
interpreted in a way entirely congruent with the standards set forth in that 
Article.”162 The response noted that fair use permits “limited and reasonable 
uses without permission or payment” and stated that “the fourth [fair use] 
factor, which specifically focuses on the impact on potential market 
exploitation of the work, is the most important.”163 
However, beyond the issue regarding the fourth fair use factor’s tolerance 
for uses that suppress demand for the original work, the government’s 
assertion is belied by the fair use doctrine’s legislative history and 
unpredictable operation in domestic courts.164 As noted by Ruth Okediji, “[t]he 
historical development and application of the fair use doctrine demonstrates 
that the only certainty involved in construing fair use is uncertainty in how a 
court will ultimately rule.”165 According to Congress’ House Report on the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (which added the fair use provisions to the Copyright 
Act), the fair use doctrine has “no real definition” but rather consists of a “set 
of criteria, which though in no case definitive or determinative, provides some 
gauge for balancing the equities.”166 While it is possible to predict trends in 
application of the doctrine given certain circumstances and fact patterns, the 
built-in doctrinal indeterminacy suggests that it is somewhat disingenuous to 
 
 159. See TRIPS, supra note 7, at art. 13. 
 160. Okediji, supra note 140, at 116.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 117. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at 118. Professor Okediji also notes that although “this [uncertainty] may be a feature of the 
common law adjudicatory system[,] . . . a careful reading of the legislative history of the Copyright Act makes 
clear that Congress consciously and deliberately delegated to the courts the power and responsibility to 
determine the precise contours of the doctrine.” Id. at 118 n.170 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 62 (1976) and 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659). 
 166. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65). 
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assert that the fair use doctrine will consistently be applied in a way congruent 
with the three-step test.167 
Given that the United States’ fair use doctrine may violate the three-step 
test, it is conceivable that a WTO member state may someday employ TRIPS’ 
dispute resolution process to challenge fair use. Indeed, the WTO panel 
recently adjudicated a dispute between the United States and the European 
Communities (“EC”) over section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act.168 Section 
110(5) exempted “from copyright liability anyone who merely turns on, in a 
public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind 
commonly sold to members of the public for private use.”169 The exemption of 
§ 110(5) applied “to specified retail and food establishments that use radio or 
television for the enjoyment of their customers.”170 The EC objected that 
allowing businesses to play radio or television in public places without paying 
a license fee would infringe the rights of copyright owners, protected by 
TRIPS.171 The EC then requested that a panel be established under the dispute 
settlement process of TRIPS to adjudicate the dispute.172 
The panel applied the three-step test and determined that § 110(5)(A)’s 
“homestyle exception,” which exempted certain small businesses that used “a 
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,” did not 
violate the test.173 Notably, the panel based its finding in part on a stipulation by 
the United States that an amendment to § 110(5)(A) had limited the scope of the 
“homestyle exception” very narrowly to “works other than ‘nondramatic musical 
works,’” which means that the exception was understood to apply only to 
“communication of music that is part of an opera, operetta, musical, or other 
similar dramatic work when performed in a dramatic context.”174 In other words, 
the vast majority of musical works are not covered by the exception. 
Thus, the panel found acceptable a “homestyle exception” that applies only 
to a subset of businesses seeking protection to broadcast a small subset of 
musical works. However, the panel found that § 110(5)(B)’s “business 
exception,” which applies to significantly more businesses that use a marginally 
more complicated receiver apparatus and applies to nondramatic musical 
works,175 could not be justified under any of the steps of the three-step test.176 
 
 167. See id. at 118. 
 168. Oliver, supra note 130, at 121. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 122. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 121–22 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)). 
 174. See Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International Distribution and Licensing § 7:5 (2007). 
 175. “Nondramatic musical works” refers to all other musical works, including “most if not virtually all 
music played on the radio or television.” See id. 
 176. Oliver, supra note 130, at 121–22 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)). Although the United States was 
required to take remedial action and amend its copyright law in conformity with the panel’s decision, it has 
thus far chosen not to do so. Carter, supra note 31, at 332. Instead, it has paid $1.1 million in compensation 
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As the WTO panel’s decision on section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act 
represents “the first instance in which a definition of the criteria of the test was 
offered at the international level,” it may help resolve some of the questions 
regarding its compatibility with the fair use doctrine.177 While there is no clear 
doctrine of stare decisis with regard to TRIPS panel decisions, the guidance 
provided by the panel is potentially persuasive.178 
With regard to the first, “certain special cases” prong of the “three-step 
test,” the panel determined that “the exception or limitation in national 
legislation should be clearly defined.”179 “Clearly defined” did not require that 
the exception “identify explicitly each and every possible situation to which the 
exception could apply, provided the scope of the exception is known and 
particularized” to provide “a sufficient degree of legal certainty.”180 Given the 
panel’s focus on predictable application, it seems that under the “clearly defined” 
construction of “certain special cases,” a flexible and necessarily unpredictable 
open-norm doctrine like fair use would violate the first prong. 
The panel also construed the first prong to require that a compliant 
exception should be “limited in its field of application or exceptional in its 
 
annually to a fund set up by the European authors’ society known as Groupement Europeen Des Societies 
D’Auteurs Et Compositeurs. Bryan Mercurio, Retaliatory Trade Measures in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Are There Really Alternatives?, in Frontiers of Economics and Globalization: Trade Disputes 
and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO—An Interdisciplinary Assessment 397, 415 (James C. 
Hartigan ed., 2009). This has been referred to as the “yearly ransom for the maintenance of the infringing 
business exception in the US law.” Carter, supra note 31, at 332 (quoting Herman Cohen Jehoram, 
Restrictions on Copyright and Their Abuse, 27 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 359, 362 (2005)). 
 177. See Mendis, supra note 15, at 75. Separate WTO panels have issued decisions regarding exceptions-
limiting provisions similar to the three-step test that are found in the patent (Article 30) and trademark (Article 
17) sections of TRIPS, dated March 17, 2000, and March 15, 2005, respectively. See Martin Senftleben, 
Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights?—WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on 
the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 Int’l Rev. Intell. 
Prop. L. & Competition L. 407, 407 (2006). Although the analyses of these panels bear significant similarities 
to that undertaken by the copyright panel, the patent and trademark panels appear to have based their decisions 
on different theoretical approaches. See id. at 435. Whereas the copyright panel employed a legal positivist 
approach throughout its analysis, focusing mainly on arguments regarding economic value, the patent and 
trademark panels took a normative policy approach, seeking to “open gateways for normative policy 
considerations, particularly in the context of the normal exploitation test and the identification of legitimate 
interests.” Id. Therefore, it is unclear how much light the patent and trademark panel decisions can shed on 
potential future copyright decisions. Accordingly, I will limit my analysis to a consideration of the copyright 
panel’s decision. 
 178. Oliver, supra note 130, at 132–33 (noting that panel decisions are “limited in terms of precedent 
value” but that “[f]airness and efficiency . . . suggest that [the § 110(5)] decision is highly likely to be followed 
by subsequent panels considering similar issues”); see also John D. Greenwald, After Corus Staal—Is There 
Any Role, and Should There Be—for WTO Jurisprudence in the Review of U.S. Trade Measures by U.S. 
Courts?, 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 199, 207 (2007) (“WTO dispute settlement decisions are not binding except with 
respect to resolving the specific dispute between the specific parties to that dispute. There is, in other words, 
no WTO rule of stare decisis.”). 
 179. Mendis, supra note 15, at 77 (citing Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)). 
 180. Id. (quoting Panel Report, supra note 179). 
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scope.”181 This means that it should be “narrow in a qualitative as well as 
quantitative sense.”182 The panel found that the “business exception” violated 
the limited/exceptional requirement because (in addition to the fact of its 
application to the vast majority of musical works) “a substantial majority of 
eating and drinking establishments and close to half of retail establishments are 
covered by the exemption.”183 The fair use doctrine may fare somewhat better 
under the limited/exceptional requirement, because the fact of its case-by-case 
application prevents it from applying so broadly. 
Applying the second, “supra-normal exploitation” prong of the test, the 
panel held that the “business exception” was “‘in conflict with a normal 
exploitation’ since music copyright-holders would normally expect to license 
the relevant performances for a fee.”184 The panel stated that a copyright 
exception conflicts with normal exploitation of a work if it allows uses that 
compete “with the ways that right holders normally extract economic value 
from that right . . . and thereby deprive them of significant or tangible 
commercial gains.”185 
The panel’s view comports with the market failure theory of fair use, 
which states that fair use should not apply at all in situations where copyright 
holders could be expected to license their works.186 Under the market failure 
construction, the fair use doctrine may not violate the second prong of the 
three-step test. The fact of the case-by-case application of the doctrine also 
arguably prevents it from conflicting with “normal exploitation” of a work, 
since a fair use finding would only apply to the parties in a given lawsuit, 
rather than broadly across a whole class of potential licensors. Furthermore, the 
fourth fair use factor, which seeks to preserve the potential market for a 
copyrighted work, suggests the fair use doctrine’s compatibility with the 
second prong of the test. 
Applying the third, “lack of unreasonable prejudice” prong of the three-
step test, the panel held that the business exception “‘unreasonably prejudiced 
the legitimate interests of right-holders’ since it was reasonable to conclude, on 
the available evidence, that right-holders would suffer significant losses of 
revenue as a result of the exception.”187 As with the second prong, the fourth 
fair use factor and the fact of the fair use doctrine’s case-by-case application 
suggest that it may not be reasonable to conclude that right holders would lose 
significant revenue due to the fair use doctrine’s application. Thus, under the 
 
 181. Id. at 78. 
 182. Id. (quoting Panel Report, supra note 179). 
 183. Id. (quoting Panel Report, supra note 179). 
 184. Oliver, supra note 130, at 123 (quoting Panel Report, supra note 179, ¶ 6.210). 
 185. Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International Distribution and Licensing, supra note 174, § 7:5 
(alteration in original). 
 186. Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 29, at 21. 
 187. Oliver, supra note 130, at 123 (quoting Panel Report, supra note 179, ¶¶ 6.252–.265). 
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panel’s interpretation, fair use is arguably compatible with the third prong of 
the three-step test. However, in light of the clear problems a flexible copyright 
exception presents for the predictable application requirement the panel 
identified in the first prong, it seems quite possible that the fair use doctrine 
would fail the test on that prong. 
Nonetheless, not every commentator is ready to declare fair use a pariah 
under TRIPS. In fact, some view the three-step test as compatible with a 
flexible, fair use-like copyright exception. In 2008, a group of experts in 
copyright law proposed a simple reinterpretation along those lines.188 As 
applied by the WTO panel, failure of any one step of the test means failure of 
the test.189 If instead applied as a balancing test, wherein each step may be 
given appropriate weight given the circumstances, the three-step test would 
already embody something like a flexible, fair-use style copyright exception.190 
There is some historical basis for reinterpreting the three-step test as a 
balancing test. When originally added to Berne in 1967, the three-step test was 
intended as a compromise meant to endorse the broad range of exceptions 
already in place in member nations’ copyright laws.191 But, when incorporated 
into TRIPS in 1994, the test evolved from a non-binding “rule of referral” to a 
“rule of mandatory application.”192 A return to the three-step test’s original 
purpose would seem to allow for the flexible application called for by the 2008 
proposal. However, the proposal is entirely theoretical, because as of yet no 
WTO panel decision has adopted its reasoning.193 Moreover, given the analysis 
of the WTO panel regarding the United States’ “business exception,” it seems 
that under what is potentially the governing interpretation, a flexible copyright 
exception such as the fair use doctrine may well violate the three-step test. 
C. The ICCPR and ECHR May Be in Conflict with Berne and TRIPS 
If a flexible copyright exception violates the three-step test of 
Berne/TRIPS, there is a potential conflict between the requirements of those 
treaties and those of ICCPR/ECHR. Nations that do not have a flexible 
copyright exception do not adequately safeguard their citizens’ right to 
freedom of expression. The human right to freedom of expression is a 
component of ICCPR (Article 19) and ECHR (Article 10), and nations that 
lack a flexible copyright exception are therefore arguably in violation of those 
treaties. 
 
 188. Geiger et al., supra note 150, at 492–95. 
 189. Id. at 490. 
 190. Id. at 491. 
 191. Carter, supra note 31, at 328–29. 
 192. Id. at 329 (citing Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test and the Proposed Copyright Directive, 
21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 105, 105 (1999)). 
 193. See Panel Report, supra note 179, ¶ 6.210 (applying the three-step test in a manner that requires 
satisfaction of all three prongs).  
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For example, “[t]he European Court of Human Rights has held several 
times in recent years that enforcement of national copyright law infringed 
Article 10 because the subsequent curtailing of free expression was not 
necessary in a democracy.”194 One commentator, recognizing the limitations of 
a closed-norm approach to permissible copyright exceptions, concluded that 
Article 10 held out “a lifebuoy for bona fide users drowning in a sea of 
intellectual property.”195 
Conversely, nations that adopt a flexible copyright exception may be in 
violation of Berne/TRIPS. If, as described above, the United States’ fair use 
doctrine violates the three-step test delineated in Berne/TRIPS for permissible 
copyright exceptions, then if another member nation were to adopt a similarly 
flexible copyright exception it would also likely violate the three-step test (at 
least under the likely present interpretation). As a result, ICCPR/ECHR 
conflicts with Berne/TRIPS, because a nation that is a member of both will 
only be able to comply with one or the other with regard to the presence of a 
flexible exception in its national copyright law. 
III.  Harmonization and the Growing International Acceptance of Flexible, 
Fair Use-Like Copyright Exceptions 
The recent trend toward international harmonization of copyright law 
suggests that the conflict between the free expression requirements of 
ICCPR/ECHR on the one hand and the copyright exception requirements of 
Berne/TRIPS on the other may eventually be resolved in favor of copyright 
holders’ rights rather than freedom of expression values. However, there is also 
significant momentum in the opposite direction. 
Since the adoption of TRIPS, copyright holders’ rights have been 
strengthened at the national, regional, and international level, often after 
successful lobbying efforts by the entertainment industry.196 These efforts have 
led to “bans on circumvention of technical protection measures and 
requirements placed on Internet service providers to remove purportedly 
infringing content.”197 Copyright owners have successfully resisted “passage of 
 
 194. Carter, supra note 31, at 323. In one example, in 2006 the Court found “that publication of the 
photograph of a business magnate charged with tax evasion was in the public interest and, as a result, the 
imposition of an injunction under copyright law violated Article 10.” Id. (citing Verlagsgruppe News GMBH 
v. Austria, 1092 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006)). The following year, the Court held that “the Austrian courts’ imposition 
of an injunction barring the exhibition of a sexually explicit painting depicting public officials and public 
figures violated the Human Rights Convention.” Id. (citing Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, 79 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2007)). 
 195. Peltz, supra note 21, at 283 (citing P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in 
Europe, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 343, 343–44 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. 
eds., 2000)). 
 196. Carter, supra note 31, at 314–15. 
 197. Id. at 314. 
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their works into the public domain.”198 There have been “significant changes to 
copyright law” under which “copyright owners have gained the ability to 
prevent access to their works for traditionally permitted non-infringing 
uses.”199 These changes to copyright law “have restricted the educational, 
research and other public-interest uses of copyright-protected works that 
traditionally have been considered the core of copyright-protected creative 
expression.”200 Moreover, the fair use doctrine is largely unique to the United 
States, and commentators expect that the United States will face increasing 
pressure “to harmonize its copyright law with the rest of the world.”201 
In the current climate of strengthened copyright holders, it would seem 
that flexible, fair use-style copyright exceptions, which have an open-ended 
potential to negatively impact copyright holders’ interests in favor of free 
expression and other values, should flounder rather than flourish. Indeed, the 
three-step test of Berne/TRIPS would seem to provide the tools necessary to 
disarm flexible copyright exceptions. However, there is a slow but growing 
acceptance of U.S.-style fair use concepts in other countries. The acceptance of 
fair use is driven by technological change and a backlash against those same 
legal developments which have strengthened copyright holders’ rights.202 
Given the fair use doctrine’s flexibility and its consequent “adaptability to 
new, technology-dependent uses not contemplated by closed-norm 
exceptions[,] . . . ‘a number of countries’” have recently “contemplate[d] 
introduction of a fair use doctrine.”203 One commentator suggests that the fair 
use doctrine has recently “escaped its disfavored status as a U.S. peculiarity 
and achieved some traction in international legal circles” and that it has gone 
from “oddball interloper” in the international copyright regime to “influential 
force.”204 Furthermore, the failure of other WTO member states to thus far ask a 
WTO panel to adjudicate the doctrine’s legitimacy arguably “speaks louder than 
words.”205 Moreover, particular developments in several countries indicate a 
 
 198. Id. at 315. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 316. 
 202. See, e.g., id.; see also Peltz, supra note 21, at 267–68; Alain Strowel & François Tulkens, Freedom of 
Expression and Copyright Under Civil Law: Of Balance, Adaptation, and Access, in Copyright and Free 
Speech: Comparative and International Analyses, supra note 1, at 287, 312. With respect to the technological 
change driving the change in attitude about fair use, Professor Eric Allen Engle suggests that “the fair use 
doctrine is both more necessary and more contentious in the contemporary global market than it was in the 
past when markets were still national or regional and copying was costly.” Eric Allen Engle, When Is Fair Use 
Fair?: A Comparison of E.U. and U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 15 Transnat’l Law. 187, 194 (2002). “This is 
because the internet is driving down the cost of copying information, and the cost of diffusing such 
information is quickly approaching zero.” Id. 
 203. Peltz, supra note 21, at 283–84 (citing Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International 
Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2005)). 
 204. Id. at 267–71. 
 205. Id. at 276; see also Okediji, supra note 140, at 121 (referring to the “deafening silence” of U.S. trade 
partners). 
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growing international receptiveness to flexible, open-norm copyright 
exceptions.206 
Recent court cases and academic activity in England indicate a 
willingness to expand that country’s fair dealing exception to include broader, 
fair use-like, public interest concepts.207 For example, in Hyde Park Residence 
Ltd. v. Yelland, the Court of Appeal considered both fair dealing and public 
interest defenses to the use of security photos of Princess Diana and Dodi 
Fayed.208 Although the court restricted its fair dealing analysis within the 
confines of an enumerated exception for news reporting, the case is notable in 
that the (ultimately rejected) public interest defense was not restricted to one of 
the “special cases” enumerated in the fair dealing statute.209 
Instead, the public interest defense was held to be a valid defense to 
copyright infringement in circumstances that are “not capable of precise 
categorisation or definition.”210 The Hyde Park approach was confirmed a year 
later in Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.211 Furthermore, a pair of recent 
independent reports on English intellectual property law contain 
recommendations that the United Kingdom adopt a more flexible copyright 
exception, and the U.K.’s response to the most recent report acknowledges “the 
need for flexibility in EU copyright law.”212 
Developments in other countries also indicate growing acceptance of 
flexible, open-norm copyright exceptions. The Supreme Court of Canada 
recently liberalized its statutory fair dealing defense for “research, review, 
private study and criticism” to include an open-ended, multifactor test derived 
in part from U.S. fair use doctrine.213 Although still confined within the 
enumerated category, it is notable that “[t]he Court’s general understanding of 
fair dealing as an embodiment of user rights, rather than a simple articulation 
of exceptions to a statutory norm, is reminiscent of the constitutional spirit that 
animates the U.S. fair use doctrine.”214 
Recent cases in Belgium and France have demonstrated “increased 
sensitivity to free expression in copyright” and applied U.S.-style fair use 
concepts.215 The Dutch Supreme Court approved in 1995 “‘room to move 
 
 206. Peltz, supra note 21, at 276–77; see also Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 93, at 4 (“[T]he idea 
of introducing a measure of flexibility in the European system of circumscribed limitations and exceptions is 
gradually taking shape.”). 
 207. See Peltz, supra note 21, at 277. 
 208. Id. (citing Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland, [2001] Ch. 143 (U.K.)). 
 209. Id. at 277–78 (citing Hyde Park, [2001] Ch. 143). 
 210. Id. (citing Hyde Park, [2001] Ch. 143). 
 211. Id. at 278 (citing Ashdown v. Tel. Grp. Ltd., [2002] Ch. 149 (U.K.)). 
 212. Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 93, at 4. 
 213. Peltz, supra note 21, at 280 (alteration in original) (citing CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper 
Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.)). 
 214. Id. at 281 (footnote omitted) (citing CCH Canadian Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339). 
 215. Id. (citing Strowel & Tulkens, supra note 202, at 287). In the Belgian case, a parodist prevailed in a 
case of both copyright and trademark infringement in which the court applied U.S. fair use principals to find 
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outside the existing system of exemptions, by balancing interests,’ in a dispute 
over copyrighted perfume bottles.”216 The Dutch government has also repeatedly 
indicated its intention to “initiate a discussion at the European political level on a 
fair use rule.”217 In 2010, a group of European academics proposed revisions to 
the European Copyright Code that would incorporate “a structure of flexible 
limitations and exceptions.”218 Finally, Israel has adopted a broadly flexible, 
open-norm, U.S.-style statutory fair use doctrine, effective May 2008.219 
The momentum toward fair use, driven largely by “proliferation of new 
technologies, to which the fair use test is immediately adaptable,” indicates the 
growing possibility that flexible, fair use-like copyright exceptions will make 
headway as an international norm.220 As the proliferation of new technologies 
also represents a proliferation of situations in which the right to freedom of 
expression may be abridged by copyright law, the adoption of flexible copyright 
exceptions in other countries in order to deal with those situations may well be 
an inevitable outcome. However, given the continued power of copyright 
holders, and the potentially governing interpretation of the Berne/TRIPS three-
step test as likely incompatible with fair use, it is nonetheless possible that the 
United States will face pressure to surrender the fair use doctrine.221 
Conclusion 
The presence of a flexible, open-norm, fair use-like copyright exception is 
necessary to adequately resolve the conflict between copyright law and the 
human right to freedom of expression. An examination of the American 
experience in application of its fair use doctrine reveals that it is critical in 
reconciling the right to freedom of expression with copyright law in 
circumstances where idea and expression overlap, where forms of expression 
 
that “the parodist used no more of the original than necessary to accomplish effective criticism.” Id. In French 
trademark infringement cases, a parodist prevailed in one case for the same reasons, but did not prevail in 
another where it was found that the use was excessive. Id. 
 216. Id. at 282. (citing HR 20 oktober 1995, NJ 1996, 682 m.nt. JHS (Dior/Evora) (Neth.)). 
 217. Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 93, at 4. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Peltz, supra note 21, at 285 (citing Copyright Act, 5768–2007, 2007 LSI 34 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.tau.ac.il/law/members/birnhack/IsraeliCopyrightAct2007.pdf (unofficial trans.)). The Israeli Copyright 
Act allows fair use “for purposes such as . . . private study, research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, 
quotation, or instruction and examination by an educational institution.” Id. As in U.S. Copyright Act § 107, 
these categories are listed only as exemplars. Id. The Act tests fair use according to four factors, modeled after 
U.S. Copyright Act § 107: “(1) [t]he purpose and character of the use; (2) [t]he character of the work used; 
(3) [t]he scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the work as a whole; [and] (4) [t]he 
impact of the use on the value of the work and its potential market.” Id. 
 220. Id. at 287. 
 221. Of course, it seems unlikely that the United States would be willing to surrender the fair use doctrine, 
even in the face of international pressure. Fair use is a part of American culture in a tradition that dates back at 
least to Justice Story’s 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair 
Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 719 (2011) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1841)). 
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necessarily include appropriation in order to be effective, and where permission 
of the copyright holder is difficult or impossible to obtain. 
There is also evidence, however, that a flexible, fair use-like copyright 
exception may violate the three-step test for allowable copyright exceptions 
under Berne and TRIPS. That said, Article 19 of ICCPR and Article 10 of 
ECHR provide for a human right of freedom of expression, which requires 
such a flexible copyright exception. In this way, the requirements of the 
international copyright regime embodied in Berne/TRIPS may be in conflict 
with the freedom of expression requirements of ICCPR/ECHR with regard to 
the copyright exception member nations should enact to comply with each. 
However, flexible, fair use-like copyright exceptions are gaining international 
acceptance. Thus, this conflict between the treaties should be resolved in favor 
of freedom of expression and flexible copyright exceptions. 
 
